Killing Federalism from Above: Constitutional Culture, the Italian Founding, and the Seeds of Contemporary Instability

Nikolai G. Wenzel

doi:10.17811/hc.v0i16.438

Auteurs-es

Nikolai G. Wenzel Flagler College

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.17811/hc.v0i16.438

Mots-clés :

Italian founding, Italian constitution, federalism, constitutional political economy, constitutional culture

Résumé

With chronic governmental instability, a dangerously high debt-to-GDP ratio, Northern secessionism, and Southern under-development, Italy continues to stagger along. This paper uses the lens of constitutional culture to examine the Italian founding in 1861. Despite arguments for imposed centralization from above, Italy would have fared better under a federal system that respected the peninsula's rich tradition of local autonomy. Although counter-factuals are impossible to prove, a federal system would likely have led to greater stability and growth.

Enviado el (Submission Date): 3/05/2015
Aceptado el (Acceptance date): 28/05/2015

Biographie de l'auteur-e

Nikolai G. Wenzel, Flagler College

Associate Professor of Economics at Flagler College, and Fellow of the University of Paris Law School's Center for Research on Law and Economics. He has a PhD in economics from George Mason University and a BSFS cum laude from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. In addition to two dozen peer-reviewed articles, mostly on constitutional political economy, he is the co-author of a forthcoming book (Stanford University Press) on the scope and function of government.